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A LEFTOVIAN TRINITY?
William Hasker
Brian Leftow has proposed a “Latin” doctrine of the Trinity according to 
which “the Father just is God,” and so also for the Son and the Spirit. I ar-
gue that Leftow’s doctrine as he presents it really does have the consequence 
that Father, Son, and Spirit are all identical, a consequence that is inconsis-
tent with orthodox Trinitarianism. A fairly minor modification would enable 
Leftow to avoid this untoward consequence. But the doctrine as modified 
will still retain a strongly modalistic flavor: it implies, among other things, 
that the prayers of Jesus in the Gospels are instances of God-as-Son praying to 
himself, namely to God-as-Father. If this is found unacceptable, Leftow may 
have been too quick to dismiss Social Trinitarianism.
The past half-century has seen a revival and outpouring of theological 
work on the doc trine of the Trinity that may be unmatched since the early 
centuries of Christianity. Much of this work has been centered on “social” 
doctrines of the Trinity, doctrines in which Father, Son, and Spirit are said 
to be distinct “persons,” where the word ‘person’ retains much of its famil-
iar meaning derived from its application to human persons.1 This renewed 
interest in the doctrine has been shared also by Christian philosophers, 
and here also Social Trinitarianism has been well represented. There have 
also, however, been pointed critiques of Social Trinitarianism (ST), with 
perhaps the most thorough coming from Brian Leftow.2 He has written, 
“one basic problem for ST is showing that it is a form of monotheism . . . 
if my arguments are sound, it is not clear that ST can be orthodox or truly 
1For this claim and numerous references see Tom McCall, “Social Trinitarianism 
and Tritheism Again: A Response to Brian Leftow,” Philosophia Christi 5:2 (2003), 
pp. 405–430.
2See Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplin-
ary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald 
O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 203–249. Further critiques 
will be found in Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism,” Philosophia Christi 
5:2 (2003), pp. 375–403; and Jeffrey E. Brower, “The Problem with Social Trinitari-
anism: A Reply to Wierenga,” Faith and Philosophy 21:3 (July 2004), pp. 295–303. 
Three articles by Dale Tuggy criticize both Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trini-
tarianism; see “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,” Religious Stud-
ies 39 (June 2003), pp. 165–183; “Tradition and Believability: Edward Wierenga’s 
Social Trinitarian ism,” Philosophia Christi 5:3 (2003), pp. 447–456; and “Divine De-
ception, Identity, and Social Trinitarianism,” Religious Studies 40 (September 2004), 
pp. 269–287. 
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monotheist.”3 He concludes, “If ST’s prospects do not look good, the moral 
one ought to draw is that it is time to reconsider LT [Latin Trinitarian ism].”4 
Leftow carries out such a reconsidera tion in his article, “A Latin Trinity,”5 
and it is his proposal in this article that will be examined here.
Two points need to be made before we launch into the main agenda of 
the paper. The first concerns the label to be applied to Leftow’s proposal. 
His own term for it, as shown in the title of his paper, is “Latin Trinitarian-
ism” (LT). However, I prefer not to use this term, since I am not prepared to 
concede that his proposal is equivalent to the classical doctrine of the Trin-
ity as expounded by such worthies as Augustine and Aquinas. An earlier 
article of Leftow’s is entitled “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” and I considered 
labeling his view as “Anti-Social Trinitarianism.” But I have settled for the 
neutral term, “Leftovian Trinitarianism” (LEFT), which identifies his view 
without prejudging the question as to just what that view amounts to.
The other point is that in this essay I will of necessity leave undiscussed 
a good deal of what Leftow says in his paper. Brian Leftow is gifted with 
an exceptionally fertile metaphysical imagination, and as a result his writ-
ings contain a rich profusion of arguments, proposals, and metaphysical 
ideas. Examining these ideas carefully (as is necessary in a study such as 
this one) typically takes considerably more space than was occupied by 
Leftow’s original statement of them. So in order to keep the present essay 
within reasonable bounds I have had to select what seem to me to be the 
most important things he says and limit my comments to them. This of 
course exposes me to the complaint that I have neglected other things in 
his essay, and that had I considered those other things my conclusions 
about his view would be undermined. My only de fense against this is to 
select as carefully as I can those items that really are of central impor tance; 
if nevertheless I am judged to have omitted something crucial, the issue 
may have to be revisited.
Leftow begins his exposition of LEFT with quotations from the Atha-
nasian Creed, the Creed of the Council of Toledo, and Aquinas. The latter 
wrote,
among creatures, the nature the one generated receives is not nu-
merically identical with the nature the one generating has . . . But 
God begotten receives numerically the same nature God begetting 
has. (p. 305)6
3Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” p. 249.
4Ibid.
5Brian Leftow, “A Latin Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 21:3 (July 2004), pp. 304–
333. Page numbers in the text refer to this article. Leftow returned to the task of 
Trinitarian theorizing in a later article, “Modes Without Modalism” (in Persons: 
Human and Divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman [Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 2007], pp. 357–375). This article presents essentially the same un-
derstanding of Trinitarian doctrine as “A Latin Trinity” with additional metaphysi-
cal elaboration. The present discussion is confined to Leftow’s views as stated in 
the earlier article.
6The reference is to the Summa Theologiae Ia, 39, 5 ad 2, 245a; Leftow’s translation.
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Leftow explains Thomas’ talk of “natures” in terms of “tropes”: “Abel 
and Cain were both human. So they had the same nature, humanity. Yet 
each also had his own nature, and Cain’s humanity was not identical with 
Abel’s. . . . On one parsing, this is because while the two had the same 
nature, they had distinct tropes of that nature. A trope is an individualized 
case of an attribute. Their bearers individuate tropes: Cain’s humanity is 
distinct from Abel’s just because it is Cain’s, not Abel’s.”7 He then contin-
ues, “With this term in hand, I now restate Thomas’ claim: while both the 
Father and Son instance the divine nature (deity) they have but one trope 
of deity between them, which is God’s. While Cain’s humanity ≠Abel’s 
humanity, the Father’s deity = the Son’s deity = God’s deity. But bearers 
individuate tropes. If the Father’s deity is God’s this is because the Father 
just is God: which last is what Thomas wants to say” (p. 305).8
Leftow recognizes, however, that this poses a problem for his view:
On LT, then, there clearly is just one God, but one wonders just how 
the Persons manage to be three. If the Father “just is” God, it seems 
to follow that
1. the Father = God.
If “each single Person is wholly God in Himself,” and both Son and 
Father have God’s trope of deity, it seems also to follow that
2. the Son = God.
But then since
3. God = God,
it seems to follow that
4. the Father = the Son,
and that on LT, there is just one divine Person. (p. 305)
Leftow goes on to explain why it seems impossible for a Trinitarian doc-
trine to reject either or both of (1) and (2) and remain orthodox. (1) of 
course, is the view he has attributed to Thomas, and is the cornerstone 
of Leftovian Trinitarianism. As regards (2), he says, “Everything is either 
God, an uncreated object distinct from God or a creature” (p. 306). So if 
7I believe Leftow’s rephrasing in terms of tropes is genuinely helpful. A problem 
arises because in modern philosophy a “nature” is typically taken to be something 
abstract; funda mentally, a nature is a set of attributes or properties. The “natures” 
referred to by ancient and medieval writers were, however, concrete rather than 
abstract: Christ’s “human nature” consists of his body and soul, not of a set of at-
tributes. Paraphrasing Thomas’ term “nature” as meaning “trope” prevents confu-
sion on this point.
8So far as I can tell, Thomas does not say this—and if he did say it explicitly, I 
strongly suspect that Leftow would give us the quotation. To be sure, it could be 
that Thomas “wanted” to say this, but just didn’t manage to get it said. I doubt, 
however, that Thomas Aquinas would be high on most people’s lists of writers 
who wanted to say things but never managed to actually say them.
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(2) is rejected, the only alternatives are that the Son is an uncreated object 
distinct from God, or that he is a creature, both clearly options Leftow 
would reject. He seems, then, to be firmly committed to the truth of both 
(1) and (2). For convenience, I will label (1)–(4) as the One Person Argu-
ment; finding a satisfactory answer to this argument becomes a major part 
of Leftow’s agenda.
An important role is played in the exposition and defense of Leftovian 
Trinitarianism by an extended example featuring (as is appropriate for a 
former New Yorker) the Radio City Music Hall Rockettes:9
You are at Radio City Music Hall, watching the Rockettes kick in uni-
son. You notice that they look quite a bit alike. But (you think) they 
must just be made up to look that way. After all, . . . they certainly 
seem to be many different women. But appearances deceive. Here 
is the true story. All the Rockettes but one, Jane, called in sick that 
morning. So Jane came to work with a time machine her nephew had 
put together for the school science fair. Jane ran on-stage to her posi-
tion at the left of the chorus line, linked up, kicked her way through 
the number, then ran off. She changed her makeup, donned a wig, 
then stepped into her nephew’s Wells-o-matic, to emerge in the past, 
just before the Rockettes went on. She ran on-stage from a point just 
to the right of her first entry, stepped into line second from the chorus 
line’s left, smiled and whispered a quip to the woman on her right, 
kicked her way through the number, then ran off. She then changed 
her makeup again . . . Can one person thus be wholly in many places 
at once? The short answer is: she is in many places at the same point 
in our lives, but not the same point in hers. If Jane travels in time, dis-
tinct segments of her life coincide with the same segment of ours. To 
put this another way, Jane’s personal timeline intersects one point in 
ours repeatedly. (p. 307; second ellipsis in original)
Now, however, it becomes possible to construct an analogue for the One 
Person Argument (call this the One Rockette Argument):
in this story, there is among all the Rockettes just one trope of human 
nature. All tropes of human nature in the Rockettes are identical. But 
consider this argument:
1a. the leftmost Rockette = Jane.
2a. the rightmost Rockette = Jane.
3a. Jane = Jane.
So,
4a. the leftmost Rockette = the rightmost Rockette.
The argument appears sound, but doesn’t shorten the chorus line. 
There is just one substance, Jane, in the chorus line. But there is also 
9See pp. 307–309, “Time-travel, Tap-dancing, and the Trinity.” (But since when 
has what the Rockettes do been called tap-dancing?)
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an extended chorus line, with many of something in it. Many what, 
one asks? Some philosophers think that Jane is a four-dimensional 
object, extended through time as well as space—that not Jane’s life 
but Jane herself has earlier and later parts. If this is true, each Rockette 
is a temporal part of Jane. If (as I believe) Jane has no temporal parts, 
then not just a temporal part of Jane, but Jane as a whole, appears at 
each point in the chorus line, and what the line contains many of are 
segments or episodes of Jane’s life-events. . . . What you see are many 
dancings of one substance. . . . Each Rockette is Jane. But in these 
many events, Jane is there many times over. (pp. 307–308)
And “If God as the Persons is relevantly like Jane as the Rockettes, then 
just as (1a)–(4a) did not shorten the chorus line, (1)–(4) do not collapse the 
Trinity” (p. 316). The One Person Argument, in other words, is “sound but 
irrelevant” (p. 316). We shall consider Leftow’s reasons for these claims 
after we’ve examined some other features of his position.
Now it is well known that there are philosophical objections to time 
travel, objections which in the opinion of some philosophers render the 
notion incoherent. And it would seem to be a defect in a philosophical 
argument such as Leftow’s if it depends crucially on a logically incoher-
ent example. Recognizing this, he spends a considerable amount of effort 
in attempting to resolve the “paradoxes of time travel.” I don’t think this 
effort is wholly successful (and he would probably agree), but I don’t pro-
pose to contest this point with him. Instead, I will grant him his example 
and try to see what benefit he can derive from it.
At this point we need to examine the positive explanation Leftow gives 
concerning the nature of the Trinitarian Persons. Here is what he says:
Suppose, then, that God’s life has the following peculiar structure: 
at any point in our lives, three discrete parts of God’s life are pres-
ent. But this is not because one life’s successive parts appear at once. 
Rather, it is because God always lives His life in three discrete strands 
at once, no event of His life occurring in more than one strand and no 
strand succeeding another. In one strand God lives the Father’s life, 
in one the Son’s, and in one the Spirit’s. The events of each strand add 
up to the life of a Person. The lives of the Persons add up to the life 
God lives as the three Persons. There is one God, but He is many in 
the events of his life, as Jane was in the chorus line: being the Son is 
a bit like being the leftmost Rockette. (p. 312)
In a note, Leftow further clarifies this by stating that the strands do not 
have in common “any events composing His conscious life or involving 
His agency” (p. 330, n. 22). Furthermore, “every event in God’s life is part 
of the Father-Son-Spirit chorus line; God does not live save as Father, Son 
and Spirit. . . . God’s life always consists of three other things which count 
as entire ongoing lives” (p. 312).
But how is this multiplication of life-strands in God possible? To answer 
this, Leftow draws yet again on the Rockette story. What makes that story 
work, he tells us, is “the causal relations between her life-segments. These 
are segments of one individual’s life not because they succeed one another 
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in a timeline but be cause the right causal relations link them” (p. 313).10 
But then “we can suppose that causal relations do the like without suc-
cession in the Trinitarian case: that is, we can suppose that causal rela-
tions between the event-streams involved are what make them all streams 
within one individual’s life” (p. 314). These causal relations consist in the 
eternal “begetting” of the Son by the Father, and the eternal “spiration” of 
the Spirit from Father and Son. (Leftow observes that “Nobody has ever 
claimed to explain how these work, so I’m at no disadvantage if I do not 
either” (p. 314).) Leftow goes on to offer some fascinating reflections con-
cerning the nature of the Persons and the distinction between them:
If one asks what sort of persons the Persons are, on this account, the 
right answer is that they are whatever sort God is—the Persons just 
are God, as the Latin approach will have it. . . . Just as Jane has her 
own thoughts while she is the left- and rightmost Rockettes, God 
has His own thoughts as Father and Son. But just as Jane does not 
think her leftmost thoughts at the point in her life at which she is 
rightmost, God does not think His Father-thoughts at the points in 
His life at which He is Son. Just as Jane can token with truth “I am 
the leftmost Rockette” and “I am the rightmost,” God can token with 
truth “I am the Father” and “I am the Son.” But just as Jane cannot 
token both claims with truth at the same points in her life, God can-
not token with truth “I am the Son” at points in His life at which He 
is Father. Just as Jane at the leftmost spot on the chorus line has no 
internal access to and is not thinking the thoughts she thinks at the 
rightmost spot, God as Father has no internal access to and is not 
thinking the thoughts of God as Son. So the Son is as distinct from 
the Father as the leftmost Rockette is from the rightmost, and the 
Son’s mind is as distinct from the Father’s as the leftmost’s is from 
rightmost’s. (pp. 314–315)11
At this point a fascinating way of thinking about the Trinity has begun to 
emerge, but we need to think very carefully in order to be clear about it. 
10There seems to be a metaphysical oddity in Leftow’s argument at this point. 
The notion that personal identity (specifically, Jane’s identity across multiple life-
segments) results from causal relations is most at home in an event-based ontology, 
in which continuing objects (in particular, minds or persons) are constructed out of 
events. Leftow’s ontology, however, is substance-based, and so it seems he ought to 
take personal identity over time as primitive, rather than as resulting from causal 
relations. Leftow, however, argues that it makes perfectly good sense to have an 
ontology in which substances are ontologically basic but in which the persistence 
of substances depends on causal relations. (See “Modes Without Modalism.”)
11A referee observes that “the big disanalogy is that Jane-on-the-left and Jane-
on-the-right do not exist at simultaneous points in Jane’s life but (ignoring time-
lessness) the Trinitarian Persons do exist at simultaneous points in their lives.” 
This is indeed an important difference; in order to bridge the gap Leftow must 
consider the different episodes in Jane’s life and the different strands of experience 
in God’s life as analogous; both constitute “points” in their respective lives. If one 
finds this analogy unconvincing, the story about Jane contributes rather little to 
our understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity.
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One’s initial response to Leftow’s account might well be something like 
this: All right, there are these three “strands” of experience within the 
Trinity; the subjects of these strands are the Persons of the Trinity, Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit. Many who have thought about the Trinity would 
welcome a conclusion such as this. But then we are brought up short by the 
initial claim made in the last quotation: the Persons are persons of whatever 
sort God is. This doesn’t seem to be right: each of the Persons, Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, has his own strand of conscious experiences distinct from 
and with no internal access to the strand of each of the others. But God, on 
this account “has” all three strands of experience, even though the strands 
are discrete and without internal access to each other. And God definitely 
does not have any additional experiences in which he is somehow simulta-
neously aware of all three strands at once. (Remember that “every event 
in God’s life is part of the Father-Son-Spirit chorus line; God does not live 
save as Father, Son and Spirit.”) But now it looks as though the person-
hood attributed to God is of a very peculiar sort; God appears to be what 
could perhaps best be described as a “composite person.” The “personal 
life” of a being who has three separate strands of experience at once, and 
no over-arching con scious ness that combines the three, is something we 
ordinarily have no experience of whatsoever, nor would most of us desire 
to have such an experience. (The very idea is suggestive of some of the 
more sinister forms of mental illness.) By contrast, the sort of conscious 
life attributed to Father, Son, and Spirit individually seems comparatively 
easy to comprehend—though of course a great deal would need to be said 
about the enormous differences between God’s life and our own. But the 
claim that “God,” as so depicted with multiple life-strands, is the same sort 
of person as Father, Son, and Spirit seems very obviously mistaken.
In fact, however, the understanding of Leftovian Trinitarianism sketched 
out in the last paragraph is itself mistaken. The mistake comes from fail-
ing to take seriously enough Leftow’s assertion that “the Persons just are 
God”—that is, are identical with God. It simply is not the case, on this ac-
count, that there are three distinct persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
each of whom is the subject of one of the three “strands” in the divine life. 
Rather, there is just God, who as Father thinks one series of thoughts, as 
Son thinks another series of thoughts, and as Spirit thinks yet a third series 
of thoughts. There are three “strands of divine life” but just one person 
who is living all three of these strands, namely God. The three Trinitarian 
Persons, then, are God-as-Father, God-as-Son, and God-as-Holy Spirit. To 
repeat—and this is a point Leftow hammers home time after time—there 
is just one being involved, namely God.
Now that we have all this before us, it seems that Leftow’s view pres-
ents an intriguing combination of elements from both Social Trinitarian-
ism and modalism. He has affirmed that, in the one life of God, there are 
three distinct strands of conscious experience, associated with Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. Social Trinitarians will warmly applaud this result, and 
will be most interested in seeing how Leftow has arrived at it and justi-
fied its possibility. If this much is granted, it may well be that the greatest 
obstacle to a coherent and satisfying Social doctrine of the Trinity has been 
overcome. (That this is so would of course need to be argued in detail, 
which can’t be done here.) But then he adds to this that there is really only 
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one subject of this threefold life, namely the very strange person we know 
as “God.” It would certainly seem that this is a form of modalism; Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are each different personae—different “personations,” 
we might say—in which the one person who is God lives his life. To be 
sure, the distinction of the “modes” is unusually rich in this case; most 
classical forms of modalism would not have postulated three wholly dis-
crete streams of experience to correspond to the different modes. But each 
of the Persons “just is” God; there is just this one being experiencing in 
these different strands.
Social Trinitarians will undoubtedly feel that the assertion that each of 
the three Persons is identical with the one person who is God undermines 
much of the promise that seemed to emerge from the recog ni tion of three 
discrete strands of divine experience. In commenting on the Rockettes 
case, Leftow points out that something like personal relationships might 
be possi ble among the Rockettes, even if each of them is in fact Jane. She 
“has genuine interpersonal relations with herself in her other roles. She 
leans on herself for support, smiles to herself, talks (and talks back) to 
herself. The talk may even be dialogue in the fullest sense. In changing 
makeup, wig, etc., Jane might well forget what she said when she was 
leftmost in the line, and so a remark she hears when she is one in from the 
left might well surprise her, and prompt a response she did not anticipate” 
(p. 308). (He observes, however, that it is difficult to see how one Trinitar-
ian Person could surprise another.) All well and good, to be sure; clearly 
the possibility of personal relationships between the Trinitarian Persons 
is one of the main advantages claimed for Social Trinitarianism. But there 
seems to be something lacking in Jane’s case. Suppose, for instance, that 
the rightmost Rockette, as she is leaving the stage, trips over a bouquet 
that has been carelessly tossed onto the stage by an admirer; falling, she 
suffers a nasty bruise. Without doubt, the other Rockettes (at least the ones 
nearby when she falls) will be full of sympathy at this untoward occur-
rence. They will gather around her, gently help her to her feet and back to 
the dressing room, say comforting things to her, summon medical help if 
needed, and so on. After all, each of them knows that it is she herself who 
has fallen; even if she isn’t suffering the pain at that very moment, she 
soon enough will be. (But won’t she be able to avoid the bouquet, now that 
she knows it is there? No, she won’t, but I’ll leave it to the friends of time 
travel to explain why not.) Still, there seems to be something qualitatively 
different between sympathizing with oneself, even with oneself during a 
different life-segment or in a different life-strand, and sympathizing with 
another person. The idea that the Persons of the Trinity love and com-
mune with each other loses much of its appeal if it is all just a matter of the 
one person, namely God, loving and communing with himself. I suppose 
someone could argue that judgments such as this one are misplaced—that 
even if they do hold where hu man relationships are concerned, they are 
inappropriate and incorrect when applied to the divine Persons. I have no 
doubt, though, that most Social Trinitarians will respond with disappoint-
ment to this “self-relationship” model. To be sure, the inherent attractive-
ness of the idea of love and communion between the Trinitarian Persons 
is not by itself a sufficient grounding for a Social doctrine of the Trinity. 
But once one has done the hard conceptual work needed to secure the 
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existence of three distinct strands of divine conscious experience, it seems 
a shame to spoil the effect by insisting that the relationships involve are all 
the relations of a single person to himself.
At this point, however, we need to consider Leftow’s response to the 
One Person Argument. His attitude towards the argument, and the par-
allel One Rockette Argument, is complex and potentially confusing. On 
the one hand (as we’ve already noted), he says several times that the ar-
gument is sound, but irrelevant; it does no damage to his position. But 
he also spends a considerable amount of time in discussing alternative 
readings of the argument and contending that these alternative versions 
are not sound. The key to the different readings is the interpretation of 
the logical symbol ‘=’ as it occurs in the arguments. On what I shall term 
the “standard reading” of the arguments, ‘=’ is interpreted to mean strict 
identity; it is governed by Leibniz’ Law, sometimes known as the “indis-
cernibility of identicals,” which states that, if x is identical with y, then 
anything true of x is true of y, and vice versa. This is the relation that is 
commonly represented by ‘=’, and logicians would normally understand 
it this way unless something in the context clearly indicates otherwise. On 
the alternative readings proposed by Leftow, however, ‘=’ is taken to rep-
resent relations other than strict identity, one candidate being temporary 
identity. only the standard reading of the arguments plays a role in the present 
discussion. If Leftow proves to be right in his claim that the arguments so 
understood, even if sound, pose no threat to his position, I shall make no 
further attempt to raise difficulties based on the alternative readings. If on 
the other hand the standard reading is not innocuous (as I believe to be the 
case), that will provide quite enough to occupy us without considering the 
alternative readings.
So why is it that the One Rockette Argument “appears sound, but 
doesn’t shorten the chorus line”? (I take this to mean that the argument’s 
soundness is consistent with the line’s being the way it is.) Leftow goes on 
to explain: “(1a)–(4a) did not shorten the chorus line because the real force 
of (4a) is
4a*. the substance who is the leftmost Rockette = the substance 
who is the rightmost Rockette.” (p. 316)
Here, however, Leftow seems to be just mistaken. What is entailed by 
(1a)–(3a) is not (4a*), but simply
4a. the leftmost Rockette = the rightmost Rockette.
And (4a) is not obscure or ambiguous; it is plainly and simply false. We 
know perfectly well how to count dancers,12 and during the performance 
12In saying this I assume, as we all do, that one counts dancers by counting the 
human bodies performing on stage. Each Rockette is a dancer, and there are ex-
actly as many dancers as there are Rockettes. To count dancers in some other way 
leads easily to bizarre results. If Jane were suffering (God forbid!) from multiple 
personality disorder, would Leftow want us to conclude that there are two, three, 
or more times as many dancers as there are bodies? Or take an analogous situa-
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there is not one dancer on the stage (as [4a] implies)13, but many. So since 
(1a) and (2a), together with the unchallengeable (3a), jointly entail (4a), 
they can’t both be true; it’s as simple as that.
But what about Leftow’s (4a*)? His thought here is that each of these 
dancers is Jane, so there is just one substance on the stage, namely Jane. 
But this can’t be right either. For all of these dancers to be Jane, she would 
have to be a scattered object, comprising many different human bodies 
and weighing something over a ton. But of course, Jane is nothing like 
that. And on the other hand, there can’t be many Janes on the stage, be-
cause Jane is just one woman. I believe, in fact, that Leftow has not given 
us a satisfactory answer to his own question, “Many what?” con cerning 
the multiple items on stage. It’s quite true that there are many “segments 
or episodes of Jane’s life-events” going on, but segments and episodes 
don’t dance; people do. The only person involved is Jane, but there is only 
one of her, and she is not a large scattered object.
Leftow, however, thinks differently. He goes on to say, “To eliminate 
Rockettes, one would have to infer from (1a)–(3a) not (4a) or (4a*), but that 
the episode of Jane’s life in which she is the leftmost Rockette and has not 
previously been any other Rockette is the last episode on her timeline in 
which she is any Rockette. It’s obvious that (1a)–(3a) cannot by themselves 
yield this conclusion” (p. 316). That may be true,14 but why suppose that this 
is the only way the One Rockette Argument can cause trouble? To repeat, 
(4a) by itself entails that there is only one dancer on the stage, and that is just 
plain false. To make progress, it will be necessary to reject the premises of 
the One Rockette Argument—something Leftow seems unwilling to do.
And now, what about the One Person Argument? Leftow actually says 
comparatively little about this argument; he relies on the conclusions he 
has reached concerning the One Rockette Argument to transfer and to 
guarantee that the One Person Argument is innocuous. Presumably, then, 
he wants us to conclude that the “real force” of (4) is captured by
4*. the substance who is the Father = the substance who is the 
Son,
the substance in question being simply God. Once again, however, we 
must object: what (1)–(3) entail is not (4*), but simply
tion: The Oxford rugby team has just scored a crucial try, but the play is called 
back and a penalty awarded to Cambridge because Oxford had too many players 
on the pitch. Leftow, however, succeeds in getting the decision reversed and the 
try reinstated: he points out that two of the Oxford players were on the field “twice 
over” as a result of their having gone through the Wells-o-matic; thus there were 
in reality only fifteen players on the pitch and not seventeen as erroneously sup-
posed by the match officials.
13In a left-to-right chorus line, the only way the leftmost and rightmost mem-
bers can be identical is if the “line” contains only one dancer.
14This isn’t entirely clear, however. As I’ve pointed out, (4a) does imply that 
there is only one Rockette on the stage, so when she leaves the stage after being 
the leftmost Rockette there isn’t any other Rockette for her to be—at least during 
this performance.
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4. the Father = the Son.
And that is something we can’t swallow, not at least if we want to be or-
thodox Trinitarians. But Leftow makes yet another move in response to 
the One Person Argument. He says, “(1)–(3) do not license the conclusion 
that the events (life) in which God is Father are the only events (life) in 
which He is any Person” (p. 316). To which we may reply, No, they don’t 
license that conclusion—but why should we suppose that this renders 
the argument innocuous? There is still the identity statement, “the Father 
= the Son” to contend with, and so long as that statement follows from 
(1)–(3)—which it surely does—the argument has by no means lost its power 
to undermine a claim to Trinitarian orthodoxy.
I will now propose a modification of Leftovian Trinitarianism, one that 
will overcome some of the difficulties that have been noted. I think this 
modification is in the spirit of Leftow’s project, and it is possible that he 
might be willing to accept it. In any case, it should help us to see that the 
prospects for LEFT as a version of orthodox Trinitarianism are brighter 
than they have appeared up until now. The most urgent problem is that of 
avoiding the conclusion of the One Person Argument,
4. the Father = the Son,
as well as the corresponding conclusion concerning the Rockettes,
4a. the leftmost Rockette = the rightmost Rockette.
Leftow seems to think these conclusions are innocuous, but we have seen 
that he is mistaken about that. The problems are real, and cannot be avoided 
so long as we assume a relation of identity to hold between Jane and the left-
most Rockette, and between God and the Father. So long as these assump-
tions are maintained, the entailments of (4) and (4a) will go through.
What we need, then, is some way to understand “the leftmost Rockette 
is Jane,” and “the Father is God,” that does not posit strict identity between 
the items in question. A place to begin is by answering Leftow’s question, 
“Many what?” concerning the items on the stage—a question that I’ve 
argued Leftow himself has not answered satisfactorily. One candidate is 
to say that each Rockette is a temporal part of Jane. But Leftow is no friend 
of temporal parts, so if possible we should avoid that notion in explicating 
his theory. My suggestion is that what we have on stage is many instances 
of “Jane-during-the-interval-tn-to-tn+m.” There are, however, a couple of 
points concerning this formula that need to be clarified. First, the intervals 
in question need to be measured along Jane’s personal timeline, rather 
than along our common timeline. In our timeline all of the intervals coin-
cide, but in Jane’s timeline they will be discrete. But second, the hyphens 
connecting the words in the formula are essential. The referent of “Jane 
during the interval tn to tn+m” is simply Jane; the expression specifying the 
interval will then modify whatever Jane is said to be doing—for instance, 
playing the role of the leftmost Rockette. So if the Rockette were identical 
with “Jane during the interval tn to tn+m,” this would amount simply to the 
Rockette being identical with Jane, and we are back to the One Rockette 
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Argument. “Jane-during-the-interval-tn-to-tn+m,” on the other hand, exists 
only during the specified interval; the expression refers to nothing at all 
that exists either before tn or after tn+m.15
With this move in hand, I submit that we have a way of understanding 
“Jane is the leftmost Rockette” that does not postulate identity between the 
Rockette and Jane, and that will avoid the pitfall of the One Rockette Ar-
gument. The Rockette is indeed identical with (let’s say) Jane-during-the-
interval-t1-to-t4. But that doesn’t mean she is identical with Jane simpliciter; 
Jane simpliciter is distinct from Jane-during-the-interval-t1-to-t4, as is shown 
by the different periods of time during which each endures. Jane’s life lasts 
for a good number of years—twenty-some already, but also, one hopes, for 
many more in the future—whereas Jane-during-the-interval-t1-to-t4 lasts 
for only a little longer than the dance performance. So we don’t have
1a. the leftmost Rockette = Jane,
and the One Rockette Argument doesn’t get off the ground.16
A similar move will enable us to understand “the Father is God” in a 
way that steers clear of the One Person Argument. The Father, we will 
say, is identical with God-living-the-Father-life-stream, and so also with 
the Son and the Spirit. (As in the case of Jane, the hyphens are essential.) 
However, God-living-the-Father-life-stream is not identical with God 
simpliciter; the latter, but not the former, lives the Son-life-stream and the 
Spirit-life-stream as well as the Father-life-stream. So we do not get
1. the Father = God
as a consequence, and the One Person Argument doesn’t get off the 
ground.
All this leads us to conclude that Leftovian Trinitarianism thus modified 
is not formally heretical, as the unmodified version appeared to be from 
our earlier considerations. That is not to say, however, that all of the objec-
tions to the view have been avoided. There is, for instance, the very peculiar 
character of the personhood of God, as a being who simultaneously enjoys 
three discreet, and mutually inaccessible, life-streams of experience. Still, 
15It has been suggested by one referee and also by the editor that my formula 
does amount after all to saying that what is on stage are various temporal parts 
of Jane. If so, this is not a serious problem for me; it would mean only that I was 
unsuccessful in my attempt to defer to Leftow’s aversion to temporal parts. But it is 
not clear to me that I must appeal to temporal parts. I should say that Jane-during-
a-certain-segment-of-her-lifespan is fully present at each moment of that interval, 
just as Jane simpliciter is fully present at each moment of her life.
16On pp. 324–326, Leftow proposes a move that is somewhat similar to this. His 
move, however, employs temporary identities, and what it shows (if successful) 
is that an analogue of the One Person Argument employing temporary identi-
ties is unsound. He never retracts his admission that the One Person Argument 
is sound on the standard reading, understanding ‘=’ as strict identity. And given 
the assumptions of LEFT, it is indeed sound, but it is very far from harmless. The 
interpretation involving temporary identities is further developed by Leftow in 
his later paper, “Modes Without Modalism.”
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this may not be viewed as an overly serious problem; the Trinitarian nature 
of God, it may be said, should be expected to be mysterious and even pecu-
liar. More serious, at least in the eyes of some, is the aroma of modalism that 
still hangs around the proposal.17 Earlier we noted Leftow’s assertion that
Just as Jane can token with truth “I am the leftmost Rockette” and “I 
am the rightmost,” God can token with truth “I am the Father” and 
“I am the Son.” But just as Jane cannot token both claims with truth 
at the same points in her life, God cannot token with truth “I am the 
Son” at points in His life at which He is Father. (p. 315)
But here a distinction seems to be called for. When Jane is at the left end 
of the line, she cannot truthfully say, “I am the rightmost Rockette,” if she 
means by that, “I am now (in this segment of my personal timeline) performing 
the role of the rightmost Rockette.” She can, however, state in perfect truthful-
ness, “I am the person who now (in the public timeline) is performing the role 
of the rightmost Rockette.” Similarly, God as Father cannot truthfully say, “I 
am the Son,” if he means by that, “I am now (in this life-stream) experiencing 
the Son-life-stream.” He can, however, say truthfully that “I am the person 
[not, the Trinitarian Person] who experiences the Son-life-stream.” He cannot 
say, “I, the Father, suffered and died on the cross.” But he can say, “I am 
the person who, as the Son, suffered and died on the cross.” The difference 
between the Persons is a good deal less pronounced than many have sup-
posed it to be. In the Gospels, we have the spectacle of God-as-Son praying 
to himself, namely to God-as-Father. Perhaps most poignant of all (and this 
should be no surprise) are the words of abandonment on the cross, “My 
God, why have you forsaken me?” On the view we are considering, this 
comes out as “Why have I-as-Father forsaken myself-as-Son?” To some of us, 
this just doesn’t seem to be what the Gospels are saying.
If these objections strike you as formidable, then you will not find LEFT 
to present an attractive or plausible account of the Trinity. Unlike the One 
Person Argument, the objections sketched above can’t be avoided by any 
minor modification; they are integral to Leftovian Trinitarianism. So we 
can close with a remark that parallel’s Leftow’s own comment: if Leftovian 
Trinitarianism’s prospects do not look good, the moral one ought to draw 
is that it is time to reconsider Social Trinitarian ism.18
Huntington College
17In the final section of “A Latin Trinity,” entitled “The Menace of Modalism,” 
Leftow defends LEFT from the charge that it is a version of modalism. He cites 
several definitions of modalism from theo lo gical dictionaries, and insists that on 
these definitions, LEFT doesn’t qualify. I don’t disagree with this; modalism is 
standardly considered a heresy, and I have not claimed that LEFT (once it has been 
modified to avoid the One Person Argument) is heretical. I do think, however, that 
it has a modalist “flavor or aroma,” and in support I adduce the points made in the 
text. Readers are invited to consider for themselves whether this “flavor” renders 
the view less plausible and attractive.
18My thanks to the editor and to two unnamed referees for helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this paper.
